Substantive Law Study Support

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)

Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits “criminal street gang members” from loitering in public places. Under the ordinance, if a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. Anyone who does not promptly obey such an order has violated the ordinance. The police department’s General Order 92-4 purports to limit officers’ enforcement discretion by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. Two trial judges upheld the ordinance’s constitutionality, but eleven others ruled it invalid. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the latter cases and reversed the convictions in the former. The State Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance violates due process in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. (2010)

This case involved interpreting the honest services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1346, which prohibits a scheme or artifice “to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” It involved former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling and whether he was improperly convicted of conspiracy to commit “honest services” wire fraud.
Held: The Court determined that the statute only covered bribes and kickback schemes, and therefore they affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on Skilling’s fair trial argument, but vacated its ruling on the conspiracy conviction and remanded the case for further review.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

Appellants’ 15-year-old son, Gerald Gault, was taken into custody as the result of a complaint that he had made lewd telephone calls. After hearings before a juvenile court judge, Gerald was ordered committed to the State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent until he would reach majority. Appellants brought a habeas corpus action in the state courts to challenge the constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code, the procedure actually used in Gerald’s case, on the ground of denial of various procedural due process rights. The State Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the writ. Agreeing that the constitutional guarantee of due process applies to proceedings in which juveniles are charged as delinquents, the court held that the Arizona Juvenile Code impliedly includes the requirements of due process in delinquency proceedings and that such due process requirements were not offended by the procedure leading to Gerald’s commitment.
Held: 1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966), held “that the [waiver] hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” This view is reiterated, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication of “delinquency,” as a requirement that is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution. 2. Due process requires, in such proceedings, that adequate written notice be afforded the child and his parents or guardian. 3. In such proceedings the child and his parents must be advised of their right to be represented by counsel and, if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. 4. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in such proceedings: “an admission by the juvenile may [not] be used against him in the absence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission was made with knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent.” “[T]he availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. . . .
[J]uvenile proceedings to determine ‘delinquency,’ which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self- incrimination.” 5. Absent a valid confession, a juvenile in such proceedings must be afforded the rights of confrontation and sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross- examination. 6. Other questions raised by appellants, including the absence of provision for appellate review of a delinquency adjudication and a transcript of the proceedings, are not ruled upon.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)

Christopher Simmons, at the age of 17, planned to commit burglary and murder. Simmons and an accomplice broke into the home of Shirley Cook, bound her hands and blindfolded her, then drove to a state park and tossed her off of a bridge.
When the case went to trial, the evidence was overwhelming; Simmons confessed to the murder. The jury returned a guilty verdict and recommended the death sentence, which the trial court imposed. The court found its way to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which concluded that the death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and sentenced Simmons to life in prison without parole.
The state of Missouri appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Held: The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. The Supreme Court noted the gravity of capital punishment and concluded: “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes.”

Turner v. Rogers, 546 U.S. (2011)

The petitioner was jailed six times between 2003 and 2010 for failure to provide child support. The duration of the six jail terms ranged from one day to eight months.
During his most recent incarceration, the petitioner appealed his sentence and claimed he was entitled to counsel at his hearing. Before the case was heard by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the petitioner’s sentence expired and his claim was rejected, arguing that counsel was only required for criminal contempt, not civil contempt. The petitioner’s pro bono counsel appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in determining that an indigent defendant had no constitutional right to counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that resulted in incarceration and whether the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Held: The Court ruled that a state is under no obligation to provide free counsel to indigent defendants in civil contempt cases. However, the Court held that South Carolina courts were required to provide alternative procedures to ensure a fair determination of the question at hand. Under the circumstances, Turner’s incarceration violated due process because he received neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures like those the Court describes. He did not have clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding. No one provided him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about his financial circumstances. The trial court found that he was not able to pay his arrearage, but nonetheless found him in civil contempt and ordered him incarcerated.

Something to Consider

In this case the Court says that “limiting liability is an acceptable method for Congress to utilize in encouraging the private development of electric energy by atomic power.” What other types of private development might Congress encourage in this way? For example, could Congress limit liability for airline crashes? (Follows Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group)

The Court states that “the purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law.” Why did the majority feel the Chicago ordinance did not do this? Why did Justice Scalia believe that it did? (Follows City of Chicago v. Morales)