Substantive Law Study Support

Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. (2010)

The plaintiffs brought a class action in a state court in California against Hertz, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters located in New Jersey. Hertz removed the case to the federal district court based on diversity of jurisdiction; however, the district court remanded the case back to state court based on the plaintiff’s argument that Hertz’s principal place of business was in California (under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332(c)(1)). The test that was applied to determine Hertz’s principal place of business was the Ninth Circuit’s “place of operations” test, due to the extent of its business activity within the state.

The Supreme Court determined that it must look at several factors in determining a corporation’s principal place of operation including where the corporation’s high-level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities (the “nerve center” test). The Court reasoned the word “place” was singular and implied a single place where the principal business occurs. It also determined that legislative history dictated that the simplest and most straightforward test for determining a principal place of business was not necessarily by the state in which the corporation does the most business, since the state’s size and population could give it an unfair advantage.

Held: The Court reversed and vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007)

The members of the Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (FFRF) brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against Hein and other federal officials who administered President George W. Bush’s Faith-Based and

Community Initiatives program. FFRF challenged the program on the grounds that the program inappropriately used taxpayer money to support faith-based programs and that the officials organized conferences at which religious community groups were promoted over secular ones. FFRF asserted standing as taxpayers.

A plurality of the Court found that the respondents lacked standing under U.S. Constitution Article III since the expenditures were not expressly authorized or mandated by a specific congressional enactment, so there lacked a connection between taxpayer status and the legislation; there was no injury. However, there was disagreement among the members of the Court over whether the Flast v. Cohen exception to the general prohibition against taxpayer standing should remain applicable.
Held: The Court ruled that the FFRF as taxpayers did not have standing to sue and the Court of Appeals ruling was reversed.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

The three issues addressed by the Court were: 1) Was Marbury entitled to a commission? 2) Do the laws afford Marbury a remedy? 3) Is the remedy in the form of a writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Court? Chief Justice Marshall answered questions 1 and 2 in the affirmative. However, for question 3, Marshall noted that Marbury had filed in the wrong court, and the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the case and was forced to remove Marbury’s claim from the Court. The questions argued by the counsel were: 1) Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus in any case; 2) Whether it will lie to a secretary of state, in any case whatever; 3) Whether in the present case the Court may award a mandamus to James Madison, Secretary of State.

Held: Marbury was entitled to the commission; however, the Supreme Court could not issue the writ of mandamus because the provision under which Marbury brought his claim, the Judiciary Act of 1789, was unconstitutional as it attempted to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond Article III powers. The judicial branch has the authority to review the constitutionality of executive acts and laws.
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006)

Vicki Lynn Marshall (also known as Anna Nicole Smith) filed for bankruptcy and also filed a tortuous interference counterclaim against her deceased husband’s son, E. Pierce Marshall, claiming that he committed multiple acts while his father was alive to prevent her from receiving money once his father had passed away. In order to prove her claim of tortuous interference, Mrs. Marshall needed to show that 1) she had an expectancy that she would be included in the will or would receive money once her husband had passed away; 2) there was a reasonable certainty that her expectancy would have been realized if not for the tortuous interference of E. Pierce Marshall; 3) the tortuous interference was intentional; 4) the tortuous conduct involved with the interference existed; and 5) damages resulted from the tortuous interference.

The bankruptcy court awarded Mrs. Marshall a sizeable award and deemed that the tortuous interference had occurred. The federal district court reduced the award; however, after a jury trial in Texas, the probate court found that her deceased husband’s will and trust were valid and that E. Pierce Marshall was the primary beneficiary; they rejected the claim for tortuous interference. The Ninth Circuit Appellate Court rendered the federal district court’s decision invalid on jurisdictional grounds and declared that the probate court in Texas had jurisdiction over probate matters.

Held: The Court unanimously decided that the district court properly asserted jurisdiction over Vicki Lynn Marshall’s counterclaim against Pierce. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further consideration.

Something to Consider

The Supreme Court refers to standing in terms of “members of one group” against whom barriers exist. In this case, the petitioner group consisted of businesses that were being denied the right to bid on contracts. Do you think that a plaintiff needs to be a member of the group against whom a barrier exists? For example, do you think that a nonminority defendant in a criminal case has standing to challenge the exclusion of minority defendants from juries? See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) and Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998). (Follows Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contrs. of Am. v. City of Jacksonville)