Substantive Law Study Support

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432 (1985)

Respondent Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC), which anticipated leasing a certain building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded, was informed by the petitioner city that a special use permit would be required, the city having concluded that the proposed group home should be classified as a “hospital for the feebleminded” under the zoning ordinance covering the area in which the proposed home would be located. Accordingly, CLC applied for a special use permit, but the city council, after a public hearing, denied the permit. CLC and others (also respondents here) then filed suit against the city and a number of its officials, alleging that the zoning ordinance, on its face and as applied, violated the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential residents. A district court held the ordinance and its application constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that mental retardation is a “quasi-suspect” classification; that, under the applicable “heightened-scrutiny” equal protection test, the ordinance was facially invalid because it did not substantially further an important governmental purpose; and that the ordinance was also invalid as applied.
Held: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation. 2. Requiring a special use permit for the

proposed group home here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws, and thus it is unnecessary to decide whether the ordinance’s permit requirement is facially invalid where the mentally retarded are involved.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)

The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is the sole single-sex school among Virginia’s public institutions of higher learning. VMI’s distinctive mission is to produce “citizen-soldiers,” men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service.
Using an “adversative method” of training not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. Reflecting the high value alumni place on their VMI training, VMI has the largest per-student endowment of all undergraduate institutions in the nation. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI’s exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. A district court ruled in VMI’s favor. The Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered Virginia to remedy the constitutional violation. In response, Virginia proposed a parallel program for women: Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), located at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts school for women.
Held: 1. Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for that action. 2. Virginia’s categorical exclusion of women from the educational opportunities VMI provides denies equal protection to women. 3. The remedy proffered by Virginia—maintain VMI as a male-only college and create VWIL as a separate program for women—does not cure the constitutional violation.

Crawford v. Marion County, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)

A 2005 Indiana law requiring voters to provide a photo ID card was constitutional and closely related to Indiana’s legitimate state interest in preventing voter fraud, modernizing elections, and safeguarding voter confidence.
Justice Stevens concluded that burdens placed on voters were limited to a small percentage of the population and were offset by the state’s interest: “The relevant burdens here are those imposed on eligible voters who lack photo identification cards that comply with SEA 483.[2] Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly persons born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s office.
Even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petitioners’ right to the relief they seek.”
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of both the district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the law.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)

The petition presents the following questions: whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, §1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. §5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. With respect to the equal protection question, we find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause with respect to the Florida Supreme Court’s ordering a manual recount of the state’s voter results in the 2000 Presidential election.
Held: The Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida.

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II)

Racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, 347 U.S. 483, 497, and all provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. The judgments below (except that in the Delaware case) are reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit the parties to these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. The judgment in the Delaware case, ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children, is affirmed on the basis of the principles stated by this Court in its opinion, 347 U.S. 483; but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem necessary in the light of this opinion.
Held: The Court affirmed the decision, but remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Delaware for further proceedings.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)

The University of Michigan Law School denied admission to the petitioner, a female Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score; she subsequently filed this suit alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. §1981. The petitioner stated that she was rejected because the respondent used race as a “predominant” factor, granting minority groups a greater chance of admission.
A district court found the respondent’s use of race as a factor for admissions unlawful; the Sixth Circuit reversed, citing Powell’s opinion in Bakke as precedence because race was merely a “potential ‘plus’ factor”.
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s reversal and upheld the university’s admission policy.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)

The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the district and used a system of tiebreakers to decide when an overabundance of students subscribed to the most popular schools. One system was to use race as a factor in order to maintain racial diversity within the student body. Parents Involved in Community Schools, a nonprofit organization, sued the district arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law.
A federal district court dismissed the suit and upheld the tiebreaker; the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision.
Held: The Supreme Court applied a “strict scrutiny” framework and found the racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause ruling that the district’s goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court’s standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race.

Something to Consider

In this case, the Court mentions that discrimination based on race, alienage, or national origin “is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means.” What does the Court mean by this? Do you agree? The Court also says that laws that discriminate because of these factors might be upheld if the state shows a “compelling state interest.” Can you identify any such needs? (Follows City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.)
The entire opinion for the VMI case can be found on numerous Web sites. Read the entirety of the Scalia dissent. Do you find his argument or the argument of the majority to be more persuasive? (Follows United States v. Virginia)