Substantive Law Study Support

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977)

The Florida death penalty statute, which was upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428

U.S. 242, requires, upon the conviction of a capital felon, a separate sentencing hearing before the trial judge and jury, at which certain evidence relating to aggravating or mitigating circumstances must be admitted. The jury, based on such circumstances, then renders an advisory decision, not binding on the judge, who must then also weigh the circumstances, and if he imposes a death sentence, he must set forth written findings of fact. The judgment of conviction and death sentence are thereafter subject to an automatic priority review by the Florida Supreme Court. Petitioner was convicted in a Florida court of, inter alia, first-degree murder of one of his children. Pursuant to the above statute, the jury, after the required sentencing hearing, recommended a life sentence, but the judge overruled that recommendation and sentenced petitioner to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: 1.

The changes in the death penalty statute between the time of the murder and the time of the trial are procedural and, on the whole, ameliorative, and hence there is no ex post facto violation. 2. The existence of the earlier statute at the time of the murder served as an “operative fact” to warn petitioner of the penalty that Florida would seek to impose on him if he were convicted of first-degree murder, and this was sufficient compliance with the ex post facto provision of the Constitution, notwithstanding the subsequent invalidation of the statute. 3. Petitioner, having been sentenced to death, may not complain of burdens attached to a life sentence under the new statute that may not have attached to the old. 4. The imposition of the death sentence upon the petitioner pursuant to the new statute did not deny him equal protection of the laws. Having been neither tried nor sentenced prior to Furman, he was not similarly situated to those whose death sentences were commuted, and it was not irrational for Florida to relegate him to the class of those prisoners whose acts could properly be punished under the new statute that was in effect at the time of his trial and sentence. 5. Absent anything in the record, in particular with respect to the voir dire examination of the jurors, that would require a finding of constitutional unfairness as to the method of jury selection or as to the character of the jurors actually selected, the petitioner has failed to show that under the “totality of circumstances” extensive pretrial news media coverage of his case denied him a fair trial.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

The District of Columbia refused Officer Heller’s application to register a handgun to be kept at his home. Heller filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia on the grounds that the refusal violated his Second Amendment rights. Heller sought an injunction barring the enforcement of handgun registration, the licensing requirements, and the trigger-lock requirements that prohibited the use of a functional firearm within the home. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and directed the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the District of Columbia. The Court of Appeals held that a total ban on handguns violated an individual’s right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.
3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment . The District’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. (2010)

This decision clarified the scope of gun rights after the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. McDonald challenged ordinances in Chicago that banned the possession of handguns by private citizens; plaintiffs argued the ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois upheld the ordinances, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed their decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held:
In a plurality decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and the case was remanded for further review. Justice Alito concluded, “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)
The provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.
Held:
The Just Compensation provision of the Fifth Amendment is intended as a limit on the exercise of power by the federal government and not applicable to state legislation.

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)

The judicial act of the highest court of a State in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws is the act of the State. Exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the state courts is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution. There is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of the State which are distinct from each other, Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; and privileges and immunities, although fundamental, which do not arise out of the nature and character of the National Government, or are not specifically protected by the Federal Constitution, are attributes of state, and not of National, citizenship.

Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and upheld their jury instructions commenting on the failure of the defendant to testify because exemption from self-incrimination was not a privilege and immunity; it was not part of the concept of due process and, therefore, could be abridged by the states.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a state solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment—even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.

Held:
The segregation of children based on race into “separate but equal” public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)

California, which has the sixth highest welfare benefit levels in the country, sought to amend its Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1992 by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in the state, to the benefits they would have received in the state of their prior residence.
Held:
1. Section 11450.03 violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2.

This Court has consistently held that Congress may not authorize the states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the protection afforded to a citizen by that amendment’s Citizenship Clause limits the powers of the national government as well as the states. Congress’s Article I powers to legislate are limited not only by the scope of the framers’ affirmative delegation but also by the principle that the powers may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)

Appellant, the owner of a large motel in Atlanta, Georgia, that restricts its clientele to white persons, three-fourths of whom are transient interstate travelers, sued for declaratory relief and to enjoin enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contending that the prohibition of racial discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting commerce exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and violated other parts of the Constitution. A three-judge district court upheld the constitutionality of Title II, 201 (a), (b) (1) and (c) (1), the provisions attacked, and on appellees’ counterclaim permanently enjoined the appellant from refusing to accommodate Negro guests for racial reasons.
Held:
1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause as applied to a place of public accommodation serving interstate travelers. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, distinguished. 2. The prohibition in Title II of racial discrimination in public accommodations affecting commerce does not violate the Fifth Amendment as being a deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law. 3. Such prohibition does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment as being “involuntary servitude.”

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)

Petitioner Brzonkala filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that she was raped by respondents while the three were students at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and that this attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim and that §13981’s civil remedy is unconstitutional.

Petitioner United States intervened to defend the section’s constitutionality. In dismissing the complaint, the district court held that it stated a claim against respondents, but that Congress lacked authority to enact §13981 under either §8 of the Commerce Clause or §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for §13981. The en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held:
Section 13981 cannot be sustained under the Commerce Clause or §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Something to Consider

What is the purpose of an ex post facto law? Was that purpose served or defeated by the decision in this case? (Follows Dobbert v. Florida)

Using the reasoning of this case, do you think that any motel or hotel would be exempt from the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? (Follows Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States)