Constitutional Law
Chapter 4 -
Part 1
Summaries of Major Cases
McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)
Congress has power to incorporate a Bank. The government of the Union is a government of the People; it emanates from them; its powers are granted by them; and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit. The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States, similar to the articles of Confederation, which exclude incidental or implied powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the constitution, all the means that are appropriate, that are plainly adapted to that end, and that are not prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.
Held: Congress has the power under Article I, §8 to incorporate a bank (Necessary and Proper Clause). Maryland does not have the power to tax a bank created by Congress, but it does have the power to tax the real property the bank resides on and the income of the individuals who work in the bank.
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. (2010)
This case involves the question of whether the federal government has the authority under Article I of the Constitution to enact statute 18 U.S.C. §4248, which allows a court to civilly commit an incarcerated individual that 1) previously attempted to or engaged in child molestation or sexually violent conduct; 2) currently has a serious mental disorder, abnormality, or illness; and 3) because of that mental state is sexually dangerous to others. If a judge certifies that an individual meets the above criteria, the individual is detained, and the government is required to provide “clear and convincing” proof through psychiatric evidence that the judge correctly assessed the individual. Once the burden of proof is met, the attorney general would place the individual in either a state facility or a federal facility where they are to remain until their mental condition improves.
Held: Yes. Congress has the authority to enact the federal statute under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)
The acts of the Legislature of the State of New York, granting to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years, are repugnant to that clause of the constitution of the United States, which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce, so far as the said acts prohibit vessels licensed, according to the laws of the United States, for carrying on the coasting trade, from navigating the said waters by means of fire or steam.
Held: A state may not enact legislation inconsistent with federal law that regulates interstate commerce.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
Pending a referendum vote of farmers upon wheat quotas proclaimed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the Secretary made a radio address in which he advocated approval of the quotas and called attention to the recent enactment by Congress of the amendatory act, later approved May 26, 1941.
The wheat marketing quota and attendant penalty provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by the Act of May 26, 1941, when applied to wheat not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm are within the commerce power of Congress. The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices.
Held: Congress has the power to regulate the production of wheat intended for personal use if the aggregate effect of multiple individuals producing wheat for personal use would have a detrimental effect on interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
After respondent, then a 12th-grade student, carried a concealed handgun into his high school, he was charged with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbids “any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone,” 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1)(A). The District Court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, concluding that 922(q) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that, in light of what it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative history, 922(q) is invalid as beyond Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.
Held: The Act exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
Something to Consider
The Court struck down the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 because it violated the First Amendment. If the statute were more narrowly drawn so as not to violate the First Amendment, do you think the Court would uphold the power of Congress to make the law under the Interstate Commerce Clause? (Follows Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition)
Do you find the majority opinion or the dissent to be more persuasive? Why? (Follows
United States v. Lopez)