Substantive Law Study Support

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)

Article V, 26 of the Missouri Constitution provides a mandatory retirement age of 70 for most state judges. Petitioners, judges subject to Article V, 26, were appointed by the Governor and subsequently were retained in office by means of retention elections in which they ran unopposed, subject only to a “yes or no” vote. Along with other state judges, they filed suit against respondent Governor, alleging that 26 violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no ADEA violation because Missouri’s appointed judges are not covered “employees” within the Act’s terms, and that there was no equal protection violation because there is a rational basis for the distinction between judges and other state officials, to whom no mandatory retirement age applies. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: 1. Missouri’s mandatory retirement requirement for judges does not violate the ADEA. 2. Missouri’s mandatory retirement provision does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)

Last Term, this Court determined on expedited review that Members of Congress did not have standing to maintain a constitutional challenge to the Line Item Veto Act (Act), 2 U.S.C. §691 et seq., because they had not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury. Within two months, the President exercised his authority under the Act by canceling
§4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which waived the Federal Government’s statutory right to recoupment of as much as $2.6 billion in taxes that the State of New York had levied against Medicaid providers, and §968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which permitted the owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer recognition of capital gains if they sold their stock to eligible farmers’ cooperatives.
Appellees, claiming they had been injured, filed separate actions against the President and other officials challenging the cancellations. The plaintiffs in the first case are the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health care employees. The plaintiffs in the second are the Snake River farmers’ cooperative and one of its individual members. The District Court consolidated the cases, determined that at least one of the plaintiffs in each had standing under Article III, and ruled, inter alia, that the Act’s cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, §7, cl. 2. This Court again expedited its review.
Held: 1. The appellees have standing to challenge the Act’s constitutionality. 2.

The Act’s cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)

Respondent Hill filed this suit in Arkansas state court challenging the constitutionality of § 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution, which prohibits the name of an otherwise-eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate. The trial court held that § 3 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. A plurality of the latter court concluded that the States have no authority “to change, add to, or diminish” the age, citizenship, and residency requirements for congressional service enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses, U.S. Const., Art. I,§2, cl. 2, and Art. I, §3, cl. 3, and rejected the argument that Amendment 73 is constitutional because it is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than an outright disqualification of congressional incumbents.
Held: Section 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution violates the Federal Constitution.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

Following indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by certain staff members of the White House and political supporters of the President, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c) for a subpoena duces tecum for the production before trial of certain tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and meetings between the President and others. The President, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged, concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption and that the requirements of Rule 17 (c) had been satisfied. The court thereafter issued an order for an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material, having rejected the President’s contentions (a) that the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was nonjusticiable as an “intra-executive” conflict and (b) that the judiciary lacked authority to review the President’s assertion of executive privilege. The court stayed its order pending appellate review, which the President then sought in the Court of Appeals. The Special Prosecutor then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and the President filed a cross-petition for such a writ challenging the grand- jury action. The Court granted both petitions.
Held: 1. The District Court’s order was appealable as a “final” order under 28

U.S.C. 1291, was therefore properly “in” the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. 1254, when the petition for certiorari before judgment was filed in this Court, and is now properly before this Court for review. 2. The dispute between the Special Prosecutor and the President presents a justiciable controversy. 3. From this Court’s examination of the material submitted by the Special Prosecutor in support of his motion for the subpoena, much of which is under seal, it is clear that the District Court’s denial of the motion to quash comported with Rule 17 (c) and that the Special Prosecutor has made a sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. 4. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. 5. Although the courts will afford the utmost deference to Presidential acts in the performance of an Art. II function, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President’s generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. 6. On the basis of this Court’s examination of the record, it cannot be concluded that the District Court erred in ordering in camera examination of the subpoenaed material, which shall now forthwith be transmitted to the District Court. 7. Since a President’s communications encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of an ordinary individual, the public interest requires that Presidential confidentiality be afforded the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice, and the District Court has a heavy responsibility to ensure that material involving Presidential conversations irrelevant to or inadmissible in the criminal prosecution be accorded the high degree of respect due a President and that such material be returned under seal to its lawful custodian. Until released to the Special Prosecutor no in camera material is to be released to anyone.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)

In 1968, Fitzgerald, a civilian analyst with the U.S. Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about cost inefficiencies and other issues with the production of a transport plane. Approximately one year later Fitzgerald was fired, and he filed a lawsuit against government officials, including President Nixon, for an unjust dismissal based on his prior testimony before Congress.
President Nixon argued that he could not be sued for actions taken while he was in office and claimed executive privilege. The trial and appellate court rejected Nixon’s claim of presidential immunity and the case went to the Supreme Court.

Held: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court determined that the president is entitled to absolute immunity from liability for civil damages based on actions taken while in office. The Court did emphasize that this only applied to civil damages and a president was not immune from criminal charges stemming from actions while in office. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
Respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas law to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of the United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made “abhorrent” sexual advances to her, and that her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court granted that request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any applicable statutes of limitation during his Presidency. The District Judge denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner’s Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the “functional equivalent” of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers.

Held: 1. This Court need not address two important constitutional issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the certiorari petition: (1) whether a claim comparable to petitioner’s assertion of immunity might succeed in a state tribunal, and
(2) whether a court may compel the President’s attendance at any specific time or place.

2. Deferral of this litigation until petitioner’s Presidency ends is not constitutionally required.
Something to Consider

In its decision, the Supreme Court says, “In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.” What does this statement mean? Do you agree? (Follows Gregory v. Ashcroft)