Substantive Law Study Support

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)

The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.
There is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified a health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals following that occupation.
Held: The limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker. If this statute be valid, and if, therefore, a proper case is made out in which to deny the right of an individual, sui juris, as employer or employee, to make contracts for the labor of the latter under the protection of the provisions of the Federal Constitution, there would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature might not go.

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)

The Legislature of New York established by chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, a Milk Control Board with power, among other things to “fix minimum and maximum . . .

retail prices to be charged by . . . stores to consumers for consumption off the premises where sold.” Agriculture and Markets Law N.Y. (Consol. Laws, c. 69) 312. The board fixed 9 cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a 5-cent loaf of bread for 18 cents; and was convicted for violating the board’s order. At his trial he asserted the statute and order contravene the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and renewed the contention in successive appeals to the county court and Court of Appeals. Both overruled his claim and affirmed the conviction.
Held: The question for decision is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk. We find no basis in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for condemning the provisions of the Agriculture and Markets Law here drawn into question.

Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (2002)

Nathaniel Craigmiles and several other plaintiffs challenge a provision of the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA) that forbids anyone from selling caskets without being licensed by the state as a “funeral director.” Licensing requires an applicant to undergo two years of education and training, very little of which, Craigmiles argues, pertains to casket design or selection. The district court held that the FDEA, insofar as it bars nonlicensed funeral directors from the retail sale of caskets, violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recognizing that the limitation neither affected any fundamental right nor discriminated against any protected class, the district court nevertheless determined that the restriction lacked a rational basis and therefore did not pass even slight constitutional scrutiny. Tennessee appeals the

district court order, arguing that the FDEA at least advances several legitimate governmental purposes. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Held: Affirmed.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
Respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Petitioners, real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, filed parallel suits, later consolidated, claiming that TRPA’s actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation.
Held: The moratoria ordered by TRPA are not per se takings of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection

560 U.S. (2010)

In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (BPSA) to restore and sustain significantly eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed an application to dredge sand from a shoal in order to restore a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (SBR), an association comprised of homeowners, challenged the permit that was issued, stating that the permit would allow an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court of Florida determined that the BPSA was constitutional, and it did not deprive landowners of rights without compensation.

Held: The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and held that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)

Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. In declaring the automobile forfeit as a public nuisance under Michigan’s statutory abatement scheme, the trial court permitted no offset for petitioner’s interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband’s activity. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, but was in turn reversed by the State Supreme Court, which concluded, inter alia, that Michigan’s failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was without federal constitutional consequence under this Court’s decisions.
Held: The forfeiture order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Something to Consider

Review the language of the Fifth Amendment regarding taking of property. (See Appendix A.) The Court emphasizes the difference between a physical taking for a public use and a regulatory taking and further states that this distinction is clear from the plain language of the amendment. Do you agree? (Follows Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency)

Do you think that the reasoning in the majority opinion or in the dissent is more persuasive? Why? (Follows Bennis v. Michigan)